NAACP Predatory Lending Financial Freedom Campaign PowerPoint Presentation

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NAACP Financial Freedom Campaign Fair Lending and Predatory Lending NAACP Economic Department 1

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Our Current Financial Picture Mortgage Lending (Basics and History) What is Predatory Lending? History of Predatory Mortgage Lending Impact of Predatory Lending in our Communities The Current Foreclosure Crisis Use of High-Cost, Alternative Financial Services (Payday Lending, Car Title Lending, Check Cashing Services, Rent-to-Own, Prepaid Cards etc.) What does the Future of Consumer Financial Services look like? What can We do to Change and Improve Our Financial Futures? Agenda 2

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World Income Levels 3

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43% of American households spend more than they earn each year. 52% of employees live paycheck to paycheck. Nearly 42% of all American households do not have enough in liquid financial assets to support themselves for at least three months. 46% of American households have less than $5,000 in liquid assets, including IRAs. Households on the edge of the financial cliff 4

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Lack of Growth Real Family Income 5

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Unemployment 6

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Growth in Food Stamp Use 7

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Growth in Food Stamp Participation 8

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Our Debt Where It Comes From 9

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Credit Card Debt 10

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Growth in Foreclosures 11

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The GI Bill also included provisions for low-cost mortgages to veterans so they could purchase houses. This created a housing boom. This boom and the increased earning capacity, coupled with pent-up demand for consumer goods, resulted in the prosperity of the 1950 and 1960s. 1940s and 1950s Housing and the GI Bill 12

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CRA: Requires banking institutions to meet the credit needs of their local communities, including low and moderate income neighborhoods Redlining: Illegal practice where banking institutions refused to do business with target communities—low income, communities of color, female headed households, and rural residents Redlining & Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 13

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Source: The Atlanta Journal Constitution, The Color of Money: Home mortgage lending practices discriminate against blacks, May 1988 14

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Depository Institutions Deregulatory and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980 eliminated state mortgage usury ceilings Alternative Mortgage Transactions Parity Act of 1982 provided new exotic mortgages such as adjustable rate mortgages, balloon payment mortgages, interest only payment mortgages, option ARMs 1980s Deregulation 15

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These laws opened the door for the development of a subprime market, but subprime lending would not become a viable large-scale lending alternative until the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA). The TRA increased the demand for mortgage debt because it prohibited the deduction of interest on consumer loans, yet allowed interest deductions on mortgages for a primary residence as well as one additional home. This made even high-cost mortgage debt cheaper than consumer debt for many homeowners 1980s Deregulation Continued 16

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Subprime lending rapidly grew only after 1995, when MBS with subprime-loan collateral become more attractive to investors. During the late 1990s, house prices increased and interest rates dropped to some of the lowest rates in 40 years, thus providing low-cost access to the equity in homes. Of the total number of subprime loans originated, just over one-half were for cash-out refinancing, whereas more than one-third were for a home purchase. Growth of Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) and Low-Cost Access To Equity 17

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Unfair, deceptive, or fraudulent practices of some lenders during the loan origination process. “The practice of a lender deceptively convincing borrowers to agree to unfair and abusive loan terms, or systematically violating those terms in ways that make it difficult for the borrower to defend against.” “Imposing unfair and abusive loan terms on borrowers” Beginnings of Predatory Lending Mid to Late 1990s 18

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Financial Incentive Structure Brokers are paid to originate loans, not to ensure they perform Lenders sell loans after origination so are not concerned about performance Servicers don’t originate loans so have no input into who gets a loan Private companies who buy loans do not always monitor underwriting policies Why Predatory Lending? MONEY $$$$$$ 19

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Strips savings, equity earnings from families who have little wealth to start with. Can push families into damaged credit, bankruptcy, eviction, vehicle repossession, and foreclosure. Has broader negative impact on communities, local and state municipalities, and U.S. economy. Impact of Predatory Lending 20

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Low / moderate income households African-American, Latinos, and Other People of Color Elderly and/or Disabled Homeowners Women Non-English speakers, New immigrants Persons in a financial or housing crisis, may be equity-rich but cash-poor Persons who lack information they need to choose the best product Persons who do not perceive themselves as having financial options Persons who are unfamiliar with the lending process and who fail to comparison shop Targets of Predatory Lending Practices 21

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Fraud—Lenders lied about loan terms Confusion—borrowers believed they are being given one loan, when really they are given another Ignorance—most borrowers did not know or understand the loans they were being offered Fear—homeowners in financial trouble believed they had no other options Why did Borrowers become Victims of Predatory Lending? 22

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Use of fraud, lies or other deceptive tactics to get borrowers into a loan they cannot afford. Aggressive sales tactics (calling all the time to pressure the borrower). Lender or broker recommended paying off a low-rate mortgage with a high-rate mortgage. Lender suggested rolling credit card debt into mortgage debt. The amount borrowed was more than the value of the property (at the time of the loan). Lender or broker encouraged borrower to get a loan for more than needed to buy the house. Loans made to borrowers who cannot afford to pay them back. Abusive Marketing Practices 23

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During Late 1990s, equity stripping practices (getting homeowners to refinance and take out cash) by unregulated financial institutions targeted borrowers who were house rich but cash poor. Other Practices included: Targeting Steering Loan Flipping Prepayment Penalties Yield Spread Premiums Single Premium Credit Insurance Predatory Lending Practices 24

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Home improvement scams Some predatory lenders were affiliated with home improvement companies Borrowers signed documents without understanding they are taking out a loan on their property Work was often shoddy or homeowner was overcharged Contractors not registered with the state Home Improvement Scams 25

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Defective Products (Hybrid Adjustable Rate Mortgages-2/28s and 3/27s) Failure to Escrow for Taxes and Insurance Stated Income Loans Failure to determine whether the borrower had the ability to repay the loan Lack of due diligence of brokers 2nd Wave of Abuses 26

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It was not until the mid-to late 1990s that the strong growth of the subprime mortgage market gained national attention. Immergluck and Wiles (1999) reported that more than half of subprime refinances originated in predominately African-American census tracts, whereas only one tenth of prime refinances originated in predominately African-American census tracts. Predatory Lending Exposed 27

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Subprime Loans contained predatory features and terms and contained greater risk. Adjustable Rate Mortgages had 72% greater risk of foreclosure than Fixed Rate Mortgages. Balloon Loans had 36% greater risk. Prepayment penalties associated with 52% greater risk. Low/no doc loans with 29% greater risk. Use of Subprime Loans as Predatory Loans 28

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Roughly 90% of subprime mortgages made from 2004 to 2006 came with “exploding” adjustable interest rates. Roughly 45% of subprime mortgages approved without fully documented income. Roughly 75% of subprime mortgages have no escrow for taxes and insurance. Roughly 70% of subprime mortgages have prepayment penalties. Other Subprime Loan Features 29

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Growth of Subprime Loans 30

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Subprime Share of All Mortgages (by origination year) 31

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Impact of Subprime Lending 1998-2006 32

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Rank 1996 1 Associates First Capital, TX 2 The Money Store, CA 3 ContiMortgage Corp, PA 4 Beneficial Mortgage Corp, NJ 5 Household Financial Services, IL 6 United Companies, LA 7 Long Beach Mortgage, CA 8 EquiCredit, FL 9 Aames Capital Corp., CA 10 AMRESCO Residential Credit, NJ Top Ten B&C Originators, Selected Years 33

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Rank 2000 1 CitiFinancial Credit Co, MO 2 Household Financial Services, IL 3 Washington Mutual, WA 4 Bank of America Home Equity Group, NC 5 GMAC-RFC, MN 6 Option One Mortgage, CA 7 Countrywide Financial, CA 8 Conseco Finance Corp. (Green Tree), MN 9 First Franklin, CA 10 New Century, CA Top Ten B&C Originators, Selected Years 34

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Rank 2001 1 Household Finance, IL 2 CitiFinancial, NY 3 Washington Mutual, WA 4 Option One Mortgage, CA 5 GMAC-RFN, MN 6 Countrywide Financial, CA 7 First Franklin Financial Corp, CA 8 New Century, CA 9 Ameriquest Mortgage, CA 10 Bank of America, NC Top Ten B&C Originators, Selected Years 35

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Rank 2002 1 Household Finance IL 2 CitiFinancial, NY 3 Washington Mutual, WA 4 New Century, CA 5 Option One Mortgage, CA 6 Ameriquest Mortgage, DE 7 GMAC-RFN, MN 8 Countrywide Financial, CA 9 First Franklin Financial Corp, CA 10 Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, IA Top Ten B&C Originators, Selected Years 36

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Rank 2003 1 Ameriquest Mortgage, CA 2 New Century, CA 3 CitiFinancial, NY 4 Household Finance, IL 5 Option One Mortgage, CA 6 First Franklin Financial Corp, CA 7 Washington Mutual, WA 8 Countrywide Financial, CA 9 Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, IA 10 GMAC-RFC, MN Top Ten B&C Originators, Selected Years 37

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One in eight (12.5%) subprime loans made in 2000 had foreclosed by May 2005. Predicted Foreclosure rate for Subprime mortgages originated from 1998 – 2006 was approximately 1 in 5 mortgages (20%) will end in completed foreclosure (i.e., loss of home) Other predictions included over 1/3 of Subprime borrowers losing their homes That’s over 2.2 million homeowners losing their homes $164 billion in lost equity CRL Losing Ground Report December 2006 38

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Foreclosures Disproportionately Impact Borrowers of Color 39

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2009 Projected Foreclosures 40

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White households $113,149 (↓16% 05-09) African American Households $5,677 (↓ 53% ) Hispanic Households $6,325 (↓ 66%) Source: Pew Research Center, Twenty-to-One: Wealth Gaps Rise to Record Highs Between Whites, Blacks and Hispanics (July 26, 2011) “Plummeting house values the principal cause” Rise of Racial Wealth Gap 41

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Mortgage Fraud 42

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Mortgage Foreclosure Schemes 43

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Negative equity, often referred to as “underwater” or “upside down,” means that borrowers owe more on their mortgages than their homes are worth. Negative equity can occur because of a decline in value, an increase in mortgage debt or a combination of both. 11.1 million, or 23.1 percent, of all residential properties with a mortgage were in negative equity at the end of the fourth quarter of 2010, up from 10.8 million, or 22.5 percent, in the third quarter. The small increase reflects the price declines that occurred during the fourth quarter and led to lower values. An additional 2.4 million borrowers had less than five percent equity, referred to as near-negative equity, in the fourth quarter. Together, negative equity and near-negative equity mortgages accounted for 27.9% of all residential properties with a mortgage nationwide. “Negative Equity” 44

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Nevada had the highest negative equity percentage with 63% of all mortgaged properties, followed by Arizona (50%), Florida (46%), Michigan (36%) and California (31%). 38% of borrowers with home equity loans were in a negative equity position. The average negative equity borrower was upside down by $65,000. Negative Equity Facts 45

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Upcoming Mortgage Loan Resets 46

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Upcoming Mortgage Loan Resets 47

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Continuing Problems 48

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Continuing Problems 49

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Continuing Problems 50

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Lack of Federal Government and Bank Loan Modifications 51

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Insufficient Servicer Staffing (servicers now working to increase staffing levels, provide more outreach etc.) Misaligned Financial Incentives for Servicers (efforts now being made to compensate servicers for modification activities) Fear of Investor Lawsuits Pooling and Servicing Agreement Limitations (legal modifications to agreements being made) Piggyback Second Mortgages (legal obstacles being resolved) Loan Modification Problems 52

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Judicial—lender must first obtain judgment in an affirmative lawsuit (e.g. New York, Ohio, Florida) Nonjudicial—lender can foreclose without filing suit (e.g. California, Texas, Virginia, Georgia) Hybrid nonjudicial—lenders can foreclose after limited quasi-judicial process (e.g. North Carolina proceeding run by Clerk of Court) Types of Foreclosure 53

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State Foreclosure Mediation/Intervention Programs State Foreclosure Process Extension and/or Modification Programs City of Philadelphia (court administrative order) – Requires representative for servicer to meet with borrower in court before a foreclosure sale to seek a loan modification and avoid foreclosure State/Local Foreclosure Activities 54

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Filing under Chapter 7 or 13 stops all foreclosure proceedings while the automatic stay is in effect Quickest way to stop an imminent foreclosure sale Chapter 13 allows a borrower to become current and repay their arrearage through the repayment plan Bankruptcy provides nothing more than a temporary delay if the borrower cannot afford the monthly payments even with all unsecured debt wiped away. Use of Bankruptcy to Stop Foreclosures 55

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The States' attorneys general are pursuing claims against banks for their "robo-signing" of court affidavits in foreclosures and for servicing abuses against homeowners seeking to modify their loans. That effort could bring a settlement of $20 billion and reforms of bank practices. Lawsuits-Part 1 56

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The banks are reportedly demanding that any settlement in this case come with a broad release for wrongdoing committed in originating, packaging, and selling the disastrous mortgages at the heart of the financial collapse. Lawsuits-Part 2 57

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The Federal Housing Finance Agency has sued 18 banks for misleading Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac about risky loans in mortgage securities that the banks sold to those entities, resulting in more than $30 billion in losses. Evidence uncovered by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission indicates that the banks knew but failed to disclose the fact that many of those loans did not even meet the stated standards of the lenders that originated or securitized them. Lawsuits-Part 3 58

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Investors have launched a barrage of litigation against banks for their actions in selling them risky mortgage securities that quickly soured. By one count, there are at least 90 such suits seeking nearly $200 billion. Among the plaintiffs: insurance giant AIG, still largely taxpayer owned, is suing Bank of America and is reportedly readying cases against Goldman Sachs and others. Lawsuits-Part 4 59

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Federal Reserve made no amendments to its 1994 HOPEA rules until July 2008, while more than two dozen states enacted anti-predatory lending laws. Member of the Federal Reserve warned of the dangers of subprime lending getting out of hand in 2000, but no action resulted Office of Thrift Supervision brought only two referrals under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act to Dept. Of Justice on matters involving race or discrimination from 2000 to 2008, Office of Comptroller of the Currency made zero Federal Trade Commission record settlements along with states against two top subprime originators but no regulatory action in 25 years The Federal Regulatory Agencies Failed to Act 60

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Consumer Financial Protection Bureau organization chart 61

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Mortgages: Stop mortgage companies from charging illegal fees, keeping sloppy records of what people owe, forcing homeowners into overpriced insurance, or rushing to foreclose before considering home-saving options. Authority: Truth in Lending Act (TILA), Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. Overdraft and Bank Fees: Stop banks from tricking people into incurring overdraft fees, help consumers get the cheapest overdraft coverage, and provide clear information on bank fees. Authority: Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA), Truth in Savings Act (TISA), TILA. Internet and Bank Payday Loans: Stop 400% internet and bank “account advance” payday loans from grabbing consumers’ wages, Social Security or unemployment benefits before families pay food or rent. Authority: EFTA. Prepaid Cards: Protect prepaid debit cards, a growing but unregulated bank account substitute, from identity theft, bank errors and hidden fees. Authority: EFTA, TISA. Credit Cards: Get inside the books of credit card companies to make sure they are not charging illegal fees or rate increases and help consumers shop for the best card without back-end tricks and traps. Authority: TILA. What the CFPB Can Do 62

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Credit Reports: Force the credit bureaus to clean-up error-plagued credit reports and to respond to consumers trying to fix mistakes. Authority: Fair Credit Reporting Act. Student Loans: Help students avoid expensive student loans when cheaper aid or loans are available. Authority: TILA. Auto Loans: Prohibit kick-backs to auto dealers who put consumers, especially minorities, in more expensive loans and stop bait-and-switch tactics. Authority: Equal Credit Opportunity Act, TILA. Debt Collectors and Debt Buyers: Go after debt collectors who make illegal threats, harass people for debts they do not owe, and pursue zombie debt long after it expires. Authority: Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Money Transfers: Ensure that consumers who are transferring money across the country or across the world know exactly what the transfer will cost and how much their family will receive. Authority: EFTA. CFPB continued 63

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Years Needed to Save for 10% Down payment 64

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Support appointment of Director for Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (so that CFPB can use its full powers to protect consumers) Educate our units and our members in the area of financial literacy Advocate on the federal level and in the states against predatory lending products such as payday lending, car title lending, and tax refund anticipation loans. What We Must Do 65